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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this study was to find whether there was any significant difference in
performance between government-linked companies (GLCs) and private-owned companies (POCs) and
there was any significant improvement in performance of GLCs after Malaysian Government’s
initiatives to transform the GLCs to high-performance companies.
Design/methodology/approach – Panel data estimation techniques were used to run the regression
in this study.
Findings – It was found that there was no significant difference in performance level between GLCs
and POCs. It was also found that the performance level of GLCs had improved significantly after the
initiation of GLCs’ transformation programme by the Malaysian Government.
Originality/value – The implication of the results of this study is that state-owned enterprises in
developing countries like Malaysia can be relevant and important to take care of social responsibilities
and needs, as also they can perform at par with private companies. There is no need for privatization of
government-owned enterprises; rather, it needs corporatization. Government-owned enterprises can
play an important role to drive national development.
Keywords Government linked companies, Performance, Private owned companies
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Malaysia is a vibrant economy with gross domestic product (GDP) of US$312 billion,
growing at 4.7 per cent per annum in 2013[1], per capita income of GDP US$10,400 with a
growth rate of 3.9 per cent per annum and a population of 29 million people growing at the
rate of 1.8 per cent per annum in 2012[2]. The Malaysian Government launched a national
development policy in 1991 to promote both the private and public sector to compete with
each other. The economy was also opened in 1991 to attract foreign investments in the
country to boost economic growth as also to create an opportunity for local businesses and
to raise capital in the capital market. Malaysia had an industry sector that contributed 40.7
per cent of GDP and grew at the rate of 7.3 per cent, the service sector contributed 47.3 per
cent of GDP and grew at the rate of 6 per cent and the agricultural sector contributed 12 per
cent of GDP and grew at the rate of 7.1 per cent in 2013[3]. The economy had become a hub
for high-technology manufacturing exports. Malaysia has successfully transformed its
manufacturing sector from state-controlled to market-oriented through price deregulation,
ownership reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), private sector development, foreign
direct inflow (foreign direct investment, FDI) and trade liberalization. The FDI together with
growth of local businesses led to the development of infrastructure like highways, power
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generation, telecommunications, etc. in the country. Malaysia has attracted $9.7 billion in
2012[4]. In 2005, fixed exchange rate regime was abandoned and a floating regime was
declared to reduce vulnerability of the currency and to expose the export sector to a greater
competition and enhance productivity in a capital-intensive industry. The industry sector
growth has resulted in overall high growth of the economy. The high industry growth has
also resulted in high FDI inflow, as FDI is normally attracted to the industry sector (Bhatt,
2008). Manufacturing is the engine of growth, as industrial goods have a higher-income
elasticity of demand (Kaldor, 1967). The Malaysian Government pursued a dynamic
industrial policy to encourage industries through trade and investment.
Government-linked companies (GLCs) and government-linked investment
companies (GLICs) have played a significant role in shaping the economic structure of
Malaysia and they have a significant presence in the corporate sector. GLCs are also
committed to corporate social responsibility. GLCs’ (G20) market capitalization has
increased from RM 140 billion in May 2004 to RM 425 billion in May 2014, while total
shareholder value grew at 13.4 per cent of GDP over the same period (Media statement,
Putrajaya Committee on GLC High Performance Transformation, 2014). GLCs
accounted for 41 per cent of the market capitalization of Bursa Malaysia. GLCs formed
the backbone of the economic structure of the Malaysian economy, which represented
4 per cent of total listed companies in Malaysia with a market capitalization of 49 per
cent of Kuala Lumpur Composite index (Putrajaya Committee on GLC High
Performance Transformation, 2009). GLCs contributed to approximately 16-18 per cent
of the nation’s gross capital formation and accounted for 9-10 per cent of GDP (Putrajaya
Committee on GLC High Performance Transformation, 2009).
GLCs in Malaysia are defined as companies with a direct control of the Malaysian
Government (Putrajaya Committee on GLC High Performance Transformation, 2006).
In GLCs, government-appointed board of directors members and senior management
make major decisions regarding contract awards, strategy, restructuring and financing,
mergers and acquisition and divestment for GLCs either directly or through GLICs. The
GLICs controlled GLCs by allocation of funds for their investment. There were seven
GLICs, namely, Employees Provident Fund, Khazanah National Bhd, Kumpulan Wang
Amanah Pencen, Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera, Lembaga Tabung Haji, Menteri
Kewangan Diperbadankan and Permodalan Nasional Bhd. Ministry of Finance and
GLICs were investment arms of the Government that allocated funds to GLCs.
In 2004, the Malaysian Government had initiated programmes to transform GLCs
into high-performing entities. The objective of transformation of GLCs through better
governance practices was to achieve developed country status for the country by 2020
(Putrajaya Committee on GLC High Performance Transformation, 2010). The
programme had ensured to make corporations sustainable and efficient through best
management practice and good governance. To facilitate the transformation, Putrajaya
Committee on GLC High Performance was established in January 2005. The GLC
transformation programme was considered to be the right direction to make GLCs
competent so as to achieve the national mission of transforming Malaysia as a
developed country by 2020. The programme had framed policy guidelines and ten
initiatives in their publication of Green Book, Orange Book, Blue Book and Yellow Book.
Each book represented different areas such as effectiveness of board structure, building
leadership and adopting best practices in management. In 2006, CEOs of GLCs were







































culture of innovation was created in GLCs to make them sustainable and competitive in
the market. The companies were given standards for disclosure, transparency and good
governance. A significant improvement in the performance of 20 GLCs was reported on
31 March 2008 (Putrajaya Committee on GLC High Performance Transformation, 2008).
Putrajaya Committee on High Performance GLC (2008) listed return on equity (ROE) as
an important measure of KPI. Average ROE of the 20 GLCs rose from 7.1 per cent in FY
2005 to 12 per cent in FY 2013 after peaking at 13.9 per cent in FY 2007, owing to revenue
growth and capital structure optimization (Putrajaya Committee on GLC High
Performance Transformation, 2008). The main strategy of government economic
reforms was corporatization of GLCs without privatization by listing them on stock
markets.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a survey of literature.
Hypotheses and methodology are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to analyse
the results, and Section 5 concludes the discussion.
2. A survey of literature
The objective of SOEs in any developing countries is social welfare and inclusive
development. Many developing countries, including Malaysia, have given major thrust to
the public sector to make capital investment in sectors of basic necessities of the
people to improve their living condition. In developing countries, public sectors
have been given to play a significant role in promoting even regional development,
production of wage goods and employment generation in rural areas. However,
managers of public sector units are controlled by government bureaucrats and politicians
and hence these public sector units perform sub-optimally. Malaysia has adopted many
elements of professional management practices to improve and transform the public sector
into an efficient entity. There are many studies available on debate on merits and demerits of
SOEs and private companies. Megginson et al. (1994) analysed 61 firms in 32 industries in 18
industrialized countries during the period 1961-1990 and found that firms provided better
results on profitability, technical efficiency, capital expenditure, employment, revenue and
dividend in post-privatization. Galal et al. (1994) found that there was improvement in net
welfare gains in terms of efficiency, market share, capital and employment in
post-privatization in 11 out of 12 companies of four countries, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico and
the UK. Boubakri and Cosset (1998) had studied the effect of privatization of 79 companies of
21 countries over the period 1980-1992 and found that there was significant improvement
with privatization in the areas of profitability, productivity, capital investment spending,
output and dividends. D’Souza and Megginson (1999) also got similar results on a larger data
set covering 1990-1996 for 85 companies in 28 countries. La Porta and López-de-Silanes
(1999) in their study on privatization of 218 Mexican firms over the period 1983-1991 found
that there was significant increase of profitability after privatization. Shirley and Walsh
(2001) summarized 52 empirical research studies from 1971 to 2000 on ownership and
performance of the firm and found that 32 studies showed superior performance of private
and privatized firms compared to public firms. Only five studies supported better
performance of publically owned firm than private firms. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001)
found from their study of 223 firms on US economy that there was no statistically significant
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Sun and Tong (2002) in
their study conducted for 24 “share issued to privatize” (SIP) companies in Malaysia during






































significantly after privatization and leverage had fallen after privatization. They also found
that privatization had worked better for firms that were fully owned by the government
before privatization. Feng et al. (2004) studied the relationship between the SIP and
performance in Singapore with a sample of 30 GLCs over the period 1964-1998. They found
that there was no evidence that the GLCs in Singapore were less profitable than a selected
group of non-GLCs that match by size and industry. They also found that GLCs were
comparable to private-owned companies (POCs) in terms of efficiency and productivity. Ang
and Ding (2006) in their study of 15 GLCs and 144 non-GLCs of Singapore over a period of 11
years from 1990-2000 found that, on average, GLCs showed superior performance in terms of
ROE and asset as also highly valued in terms of good governance practices and plan
implementation, compared to non-GLCs. In their study on 17 GLCs and 92 private
enterprises in three sectors of manufacturing; transport, storage and communications; and
multi-industry of Singapore’s corporate sector covering 1994-1998, Ramirez and Tan (2003)
found that both GLCs and their counterpart private sector in Singapore were on the same
level-playing field in terms of competing for their finances. They also found that the
Singaporean capital market perception was higher in the case of GLCs than non-GLCs.
Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) found from a heterogeneous group of very large firms doing
business around the world that government-owned firms are significantly less profitable
than privately owned firms to the extent of profitability and efficiency. It was also found that
government firms had high leverage compared to private firms. Gupta (2005) found that
there was significant increase of profitability, productivity and efficiency in partially
privatized firms in India during 1991-1998. He also found that performance on managerial
efficiency had increased post-privatization. Omran (2004) had compared performance of
private companies and SOEs of Egypt during the period of 1994-1998 and found that there
was no significant difference in performance between private firms and SOEs. Chong and
López-de-Silanes (2003) showed that privatization yielded robust performance
improvements in Latin American companies. In another study, Boubakri et al. (2004) studied
privatization of 50 companies spread over ten Asian countries over the period of 1980-1999
and found that there was less significant effect of post-privatization compared to other
developing countries in terms of profitability, efficiency and output. Boubakri et al. (2008)
reiterated their result of an earlier study from a larger sample of 230 companies spread over
32 developing countries and found that privatization had improved performance. Lin et al.
(2001) suggested that corporate governance could be improved even with the government
control. Aivazian et al. (2005) based on their study on 308 SOEs for the period from 1993 to
1998 found that corporatization without privatization could have a positive impact on firm
performance. Chen et al. (2009) had grouped China’s listed companies into four groups,
namely, companies controlled by state asset management bureaus (SAMBs), SOEs affiliated
to central government (SOECGs), SOEs affiliated to local government (SOELGs) and private
investors. They covered the period 1999-2004 with a sample consisting of 6,113 firm-year
observations, out of which 3,065 observations pertained to SOELGs, 1,241observations to
private investors, 968 observations to SAMBs and 839 observations to SOECGs. They found
in their study that SOECGs performed the best, followed by SOELGs. The private controlled
listed firms and the bureaucratic SAMBs had performed the worst, among all the four
groups. In another study on China, Wang (2009) found that the SOE group had made
significant performance even with the monitoring of the group by the government. Lau and
Tong (2008) conducted a study of 15 GLCs over six years from 2000 to 2005 and found that







































firm value. Razak et al. (2008) in their study of 210 companies listed in main board in Bursa
Malaysia during 1995-2005 found that GLCs performed better than non-GLCs when an
accounting measure such as ROE or return on assets (ROA) was used. Koe (2014) measured
performance of GLCs in Malaysia in terms of entrepreneurial orientation (EO), which was
conceptualized by Lumkin and Dess (1996). Based on the sample of 153 subsidiaries and
branches of G20, Koe found that all five dimensions of EO significantly and positively
influenced the performance of GLCs. He found that GLCs in Malaysia were more
entrepreneurial in managing their organization to achieve high performance. Based on the
review of main empirical studies, Parker and Kirkpatrik (2005) suggested that privatization
would succeed if it was complemented by policies that promoted economic efficiency,
administrative competency and built institutions to cope up with privatization.
The objective of the study was to find whether there was any significant difference in
performance between GLCs and POCs in Malaysia and there was any significant
improvement in performance of GLCs after Malaysian Government’s initiatives to
transform the GLCs to high-performance companies.
3. Hypotheses and methodology of study
In this study, the following two hypotheses were constructed to understand the
performance level of GLCs and POCs:
H1. There is no difference in performance between GLCs and POCs.
H2. There is no improvement in performance of GLCs after Malaysian Government’s
initiatives to transform the GLCs to high-performance companies in 2005.
3.1 Methodology of study
Panel data estimation techniques were used to run the regression in this study.
Following Baltagi (1995), the models considered to be estimated here are given by:
ROE  b0  b1 DUM  b2 (SALES/ASSET)  b3 LEV  b4 DUMT
 ui  vt  wit
(1)
ROA  b0  b1 DUM  b2 (SALES/ASSET)  b3 LEV  b4 DUMT
 ui  vt  wit
(2)
RIC  b0  b1 DUM  b2 (SALES/ASSET)  b3 LEV  b4 DUMT
 ui  vt  wit
(3)
Where,
ROE  return on equity;
ROA  return on assets;
RIC  return on invested capital; and
DUM  a dummy variable used to distinguish between the performances of GLCs
and POCs.







































DUMT – a second dummy used here to understand the effects of Malaysian
Government’s initiatives to transform the GLCs to high-performance companies:
DUMT  0, for 1996  2006
 1, for 2007  2013
SALES/ASSETS ratio and Leverage were used as a control variables in the regression
because they had high impact on performance of the firms.
ROE, ROA and RIC denoted the dependent variables for ith firm at time t, b denotes
the vector p  1 and independent variable was the itth observation on the p variables
(p  4 in this case). ui represented individual effects, vt represented period effects and wit
was the error term after removing the individual and period effects.
3.2 Sample
In this study, 18 GLCs and 65 POCs were selected. Most of the GLCs are corporate
groups having subsidiaries affiliated to the group. The distribution of GLCs and POCs
by industry category is given in Appendix 1. Data source for the analysis was Thomson
Datastream. The data covered 83 companies (18 GLCs and 65 POCs) over a period of 18
years from 1996 to 2013. Only those companies were selected where data were complete
in Thomson Datastream.
3.3 Dependent variables
Following the literature, three performance measures were selected, namely, ROE, the
ratio of profits after deduction of tax and interest over the equity of shareholder; ROA,
ratio of profits after deduction of tax and interest over average book value of total assets;
and RIC, ratio of profits after deduction of tax and interest over invested capital.
ROE, ROA and RIC are used as proxies for accounting-based performance measures,
as they are more relevant in developing countries like Malaysia (Chang and Choi, 1988;
Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). They are widely used performance measures (Vafeas (1999),
Ang and Ding (2006), Bhagat and Black (2002)).
3.4 Independent variables
A dummy variable (DUM) was used to distinguish between the performances of GLCs
and POCs. A second dummy variable (DUMT) was used to understand the effects of
Malaysian Government’s initiatives to transform the GLCs to high-performance
companies.
3.5 Control variables
Sales-assets ratio is used as a controlled variable, as it has a huge impact on performance
of the firms. Higher the sales-asset ratio, higher the performance of the firm. Leverage is
another control variable selected in the model which influences the performance of the
companies. Leverage is percentage of debt to common equity. Higher the ratio, higher
the constraint to the firm, as it is the risk of bankruptcy if the firm finds it difficult to
repay amortization and interest. However, debt can be used as an opportunity to monitor







































4. Analysis of results
The model was estimated by the generalized least-squares method with Swamy and
Arora estimator of component variances. The Hausman test was used to select the
appropriate model of estimation. It was found that the Hausman test was
insignificant, and hence, a random-effect model as an alternative to a fixed-effect
model was selected for estimation. The result of the model is given in Table I. It was
found that the dummy variable (DUM) was insignificant in all the three models
mentioned above, and hence, the H1 that there was no difference in performance
between GLCs and POCs was accepted. This indicated that there was no significance
difference in performance level between GLCs and POCs. The results corroborated
the findings of Lau and Tong (2008), Razak et al. (2008) and Koe (2014). The results
were highly consistent with the results of Ang and Ding (2006) and Feng et al. (2004).
Sales-asset ratio is positive and significant in all three models. Leverage is negative
and significant in all the three models. The average rate of ROE, assets, invested
capital; sales, revenue and leverage separately for GLCs and POCs during 1996-2013
are given in Table II. It can be seen from the table that the average ROE for GLC was
higher than that of POC for eight years and was less than in the remaining years
during 1996-2013. Similarly, ROA and RIC were higher for GLC than that of POC for
five years and eight years, respectively, during the same period. However, asset,
sales and leverage were higher in the case of GLCs than that of POCs for all years
during the same period. This is because GLCs are corporates having many
subsidiaries and hence higher asset and sale. High leverage of GLCs is due to active
government support and hence do not find any difficulty to get loans from lenders.
Normality test statistic for all variables is given in Table III. DUMT was significant
in all the three models mentioned above and hence H2 was rejected. That is, there
was significant improvement in performance of GLCs after Malaysian
Government’s initiatives to transform the GLCs to high-performance companies.
The GLCs’ transformation programme was designed with dual objectives of








Dependent variable ROE ROA RCI
Independent variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Constant 5.111435 0.0004 3.695950 0.0000 3.296611 0.0036
DUM 1.235732 0.5939 0.501482 0.6028 1.162680 0.5109
Sales-asset ratio 3.863244 0.0042 1.684240 0.0016 2.740348 0.0109
Leverage 0.030501 0.0000 0.003919 0.0002 0.005212 0.0294
DUMT 4.173299 0.0009 1.237931 0.0073 3.497195 0.0015
R-squared 0.094379 0.079147 0.017086
Adjusted R-squared 0.091947 0.068772 0.014446
SE of regression 23.57782 11.16052 20.55174
F-statistics 38.79414 7.628077 6.470869
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000007 0.000037
Durbin–Watson 1.593264 1.915832 2.030665
No. observations 1,494 1,494 1,494
Hausman test
Chi-square statistic 6.826257 4.081551 1.570871






































accelerate the nation’s social and economic development (Putrajaya Committee on
GLC High Performance Transformation, 2010). Both GLICs and GLCs had been
entrusted with the role of accelerating national economic development by
spearheading the creation of special economic development regions. GLCs were
becoming critical drivers in stimulating economic activities across Malaysia to
address uneven levels of development, eradicate poverty, raise standards of living,
stimulate priority sectors and develop world-class cities (Putrajaya Committee on
GLC High Performance Transformation, 2010). Thus, the findings contribute to the
understanding that GLCs performed at par with POCs and performance of GLCs
improved significantly after the initiation of the GLC transformation programme.
5. Conclusion
GLCs and GLICs formed an integral part of the economic structure of Malaysia. GLC
companies accounted for 41 per cent of the market capitalization of Bursa Malaysia.
GLCs formed the backbone of the economic structure of the Malaysian economy; GLCs
represented 4 per cent of total listed companies with market capitalization of 49 per cent
of Kuala Lumpur Composite index. The main objective of the programme was to create
sustainable corporations with good management practices and governance. It was
found that there was no significant difference in performance level between GLCs and
POCs. It was also found that that performance level of GLC had improved significantly
after the initiation of the GLC transformation programme.
Table II.
Mean of ROE, ROA










GLC POC GLC POC GLC POC GLC POC GLC POC GLC POC
1996 18.19 10.17 9.11 7.40 12.52 8.82 2.77 0.54 13.17 1.68 102.38 62.57
1997 11.13 11.09 5.21 6.22 7.51 8.73 3.30 0.64 16.22 2.23 120.52 70.75
1998 1.14 6.36 2.61 1.83 4.02 9.59 3.73 0.64 16.69 2.42 144.66 94.63
1999 3.56 0.95 1.48 5.64 2.72 6.07 3.59 0.58 19.71 2.51 156.44 125.90
2000 1.13 2.52 3.09 4.47 4.49 5.21 4.03 0.65 20.69 2.52 167.03 172.69
2001 9.05 6.13 2.43 4.60 3.31 4.85 4.49 0.68 22.31 2.93 315.07 102.42
2002 0.02 2.09 4.37 2.99 6.39 3.24 4.73 0.74 24.17 3.36 249.37 91.23
2003 4.97 6.95 3.06 4.56 4.89 5.72 5.13 0.90 25.42 3.80 174.58 85.38
2004 1.04 6.80 6.21 4.40 8.89 5.81 5.45 1.06 27.92 4.23 183.78 63.52
2005 9.04 5.37 0.76 4.34 1.45 5.55 6.57 1.18 29.21 4.49 151.69 68.45
2006 0.30 6.04 2.19 4.21 1.80 5.73 7.43 1.23 33.98 4.93 95.73 66.90
2007 25.86 10.13 14.90 6.39 32.25 8.49 8.13 1.27 38.10 5.70 80.07 58.52
2008 11.56 8.53 5.40 5.58 9.11 7.60 8.46 1.58 39.65 6.05 77.28 55.85
2009 11.01 7.86 4.13 4.98 7.37 6.60 8.58 1.53 44.60 6.77 95.96 49.16
2010 14.18 9.13 4.79 5.95 9.20 7.42 8.84 1.70 49.43 7.24 77.35 43.00
2011 5.50 9.19 2.00 6.20 5.03 8.01 10.13 1.89 58.70 8.08 111.63 45.99
2012 8.42 10.54 3.37 5.80 6.80 8.29 10.89 2.04 65.21 9.24 107.75 51.92
2013 6.84 13.63 2.91 5.83 6.11 9.23 11.04 2.20 72.94 9.84 94.97 49.12


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1. World Economic Forum, Report of Global Competitiveness 2014-2015.
2. World Bank, World Development Report 2014.
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1. Airport and airways 1 1
2. Automobile and parts 2 4 6
3. Banking 5 4 8
4. Chemicals 1 4 6
5. Construction materials 1 11 12
6. Electronics and electrical 4 4
7. Energy 1 1
8. Food producers 7 7
9. Industrial engineering 1 6 7
10. Tele & mobile communication 1 1 2
11. Petroleum and natural gas 3 0 3
12. Real estate and property development 10 10
13. Software and computer science 2 2
14. Technology hardware & equipment 3 3
15. General industrials 4 4
16. Financial service sectors 1 1 2
17. Health equipment & developments 1 1 2
18. Household goods and Home construction 3 3
Total 18 65 83
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